Ideas-having-champions is a natural feature of the world with at least some positive effects: every individual becoming a dispassionate truthseeker in all contexts would not be an unmitigated good. I wrote this in a LessWrong comment a while ago:

As soon as I’ve said “P” out loud, it is the case that my epistemic reputation is bound up with the group’s belief in the truth of P. If people later come to believe P, it means that (a) whatever scoring rule we’re using to incentivize good predictions in the first place will reward me, and (b) people will update more on things I say in the future.

If you wanted to find convincing evidence for P, I’m now a much better candidate to find that evidence than someone who has instead said “eh; maybe P?” And someone who has said “not P” is similarly well-incentivized to find evidence for not P.

I think this feature of reality is pretty useful, and society does in fact use it; most obviously in the legal system.

I don’t really know what to do with this info, but it feels pretty important.